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“I THINK YOU DIDN’T GET IT BECAUSE 
THEY MISIDENTIFIED YOU AS LATINA”: A 
COMMENTARY ON MULTIRACIALS AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS: MIXED-RACE STORIES OF 
DISCRIMINATION 




Liz was interviewing for a tenure-track, entry-level law faculty 
position at Law School X, “ranked” (in that year) around 100.  She 
had heard a rumor that the law school was determined to hire a 
person who would add to the diversity of the faculty, which was 
both White- and male-dominated.   
Liz’s “job talk,” a presentation on a current article that she was 
writing, used Liz’s own multiracial identification to illustrate a 
point relevant to her research, which utilized both critical race the-
ory and feminist legal theory.  In the course of explaining her illus-
tration, Liz mentioned that she was often identified by others as 
Latina, but that her background (and her identification) was Asian 
Pacific American and White.   
Several weeks after the interview, the chair of the search commit-
tee called to tell Liz that although the faculty “had not voted not to 
give her an offer,” other candidates would be offered the position 
before Liz was offered it, and the chair anticipated that another 
candidate or candidates would accept the position before it could 
be offered to Liz.  When she asked the chair and, later, another fac-
ulty member, for feedback on areas in which she could improve, she 
 
*Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.S.F.S., Georgetown Uni-
versity; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Nadia Ahmad, Shelley L. 
Cavalieri, Charlotte Garden & Lua Kamal Yuille for reading and commenting upon earlier 
drafts. 
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was told that, although she had experience teaching Contracts, be-
cause she did not write scholarship on Contracts, she lacked credi-
bility as someone who truly wanted to teach or would teach Con-
tracts well. 
A week or so later, without clarifying whether Liz might still get 
an offer to join the faculty, the chair called again, explaining that 
she needed to report demographic information about all of the can-
didates to the Association of American Law Schools, and asked 
what she should list as Liz’s race.  Liz was taken aback and some-
what confused by the question because she thought that various in-
dications on her CV of volunteer work with Asian Pacific American 
organizations, as well as her job talk illustration, made it unneces-
sary for the chair to ask this question.  Nevertheless, not knowing 
whether her candidacy was still active, Liz did not refuse to answer 
the question.  Instead, she explained the intricacies of answering 
such questions when one is multiracial, including that the answer 
often depends on the options provided: did the form provide racial 
categories and say “check all that apply”?  Did it provide a single 
“multiracial” category?  Or was there simply an “other” and did it 
provide a write-in space?   
After Liz explained how she would fill out each kind of form, the 
chair ended the call, and Liz texted an account of the conversation 
to friends.  She explained later that her purpose in the texts was in 
part to have a contemporaneous account of the conversation (in 
which she also described what happened at the interview, as back-
ground to the phone call with the chair), which had left her feeling 
troubled.  However, she didn’t seriously consider legal action.  She 
learned about nine months later that Law School X had hired two 
men of color and that one had been asked to teach Contracts, even 
though he had never taught Contracts and did not write on topics 
even remotely related to Contracts.  A White woman professor at 
Law School X, whose research areas overlapped significantly with 
Liz’s, remarked to Liz, when discussing Liz’s candidacy, that she 
and other (unspecified) faculty members had struggled with the is-
sue of hiring new colleagues “who looked just like” those already on 
the faculty. 
Nearly a year after the interview, which Liz spent at a different, 
lower-ranked law school in a tenure-track post, Liz had lunch with 
a friend on Law School X’s faculty.  A tenured, White, and male 
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faculty member who had been at Law School X for about 10 years, 
he told Liz, chuckling, “I think they didn’t offer you the job because 
they thought you were Latina, but then found out you were not!”  As 
annoying as she found his privileged amusement at a situation that 
Liz had experienced as biased and discriminatory, she kept to her 
decision not to consult an employment discrimination attorney 
friend about potential claims for several reasons.  First, although 
employment discrimination was not her field, she suspected any 
claim she made would be very hard to win.  Second, in light of the 
difficulties in winning such a case, Liz decided the potential costs 
to her future career and collegial relationships, especially as she 
had many years before even going up for tenure, far outweighed the 
potential benefits.  Finally and most importantly, she realized that 
she felt uncomfortable even making such a legal claim, as Law 
School X had been committed to diversifying its faculty and had 
indeed hired two (monoracial-identifying and -identified) faculty 
of color, making her feel as if any discrimination claim would 
smack of “reverse discrimination.” 
This hypothetical, “based on true events” as they say in the mov-
ies, poses some interesting questions for the topic that Professor 
Tanya Katerí Hernández tackles in Multiracials and Civil Rights: 
Mixed-Race Stories of Discrimination, her volume on how multira-
cial-identifying Americans experience race discrimination and 
how anti-discrimination civil rights laws do and should respond. 
So, too, does a set of distressing, yet rarely discussed, statistics 
found in the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Sur-
vey (“NISVS”), showing that an average of one-in-two multiracial 
women experiences intimate partner or sexual violence in her life-
time, a form of discrimination that targets multiracial women at 
higher rates than any other demographic group in the U.S.1 
Professor Hernández’s detailed look at court opinions in cases 
brought by multiracial plaintiffs, as well as her own reflections on 
life as a multiracial person, points out that existing civil rights law 
can address the discrimination experienced by multiracial 
 
1 MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT  3 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/violencepreven-
tion/pdf/nisvs_executive_summary-a.pdf. 
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plaintiffs.2 Her analysis thus disagrees with that of various au-
thors who Professor Hernández identifies with the term “multira-
cial-identity scholars,” as well as non-legal advocates for special 
treatment of multiracial Americans, such as the Multiracial Cate-
gory Movement that lobbied for changes to the U.S. Census.3 Pro-
fessor Hernández draws this conclusion in part because of the “ca-
pacious” quality of civil rights laws, which she argues are as 
capable of addressing race discrimination against multiracial peo-
ple as against “monoracial” people.4 Although not as important as 
this capaciousness, another critical reason is related to the multi-
racial plaintiff’s “phenotype:” that is, the source of the discrimina-
tion these plaintiffs face is largely, if not entirely, based on the 
monoracial category that the (White) employers think they look 
like.5 This is particularly true for those multiracial plaintiffs 
whose own phenotype, or the phenotypes of their friends and fam-
ily, identify them as part African American. Indeed, Professor Her-
nández’s analysis demonstrates that even an association with 
Blackness through some method not related to phenotype (e.g., an 
Ancestry.com report explaining that a White-looking plaintiff who 
“had… lived as a White man” all his life had African ancestry6) can 
be sufficient to trigger anti-Black animus. 
Professor Hernández’s analysis is thus highly persuasive—for 
the cases that have reached court and for multiracial plaintiffs 
marked in some way as African American and therefore subjected 
to anti-Black bias and discrimination.  But Liz’s case differs in two 
ways from the instances of multiracial discrimination at the core 
of Professor Hernández’s analysis.  First, the Law School X faculty 
did not think Liz was African American, so anti-Black racism was 
not at issue in their hiring decisions.  Second, Liz’s reasons for not 
 
2 See TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ, MULTIRACIALS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: MIXED-RACE 
STORIES OF DISCRIMINATION 5–6, 9 (2018) (describing the issues and conclusion addressed 
throughout the book); see generally id. at ix–xvii (providing a narrative of her family’s story 
and her life as a mixed-race person).  
3 See id. at 4–5, 13–15 (beginning on page 4, then discussed throughout the book); see 
also id. at 97–98 (describing the Multiracial Category Movement (“MCM”)).  
4 See id. at 11–12, 15, 19, 100. Note that this assessment does not suggest that civil 
rights laws address all of the race discrimination that exists—merely that multiracial plain-
tiffs are not uniquely disadvantaged in comparison to monoracial plaintiffs under these 
laws. See also id. at 17–18, 111. 
5 See id. at 30–32.  
6 See id. at 1. 
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pursuing a lawsuit show that her case almost certainly would 
never make it to court or, therefore, into Professor Hernández’s 
analysis.  What is less clear is whether there are many cases like 
Liz’s, as well as what implications her and any similar cases might 
have for civil rights law.  
Likewise, as explained infra, despite being clear victims of dis-
crimination, the overwhelming number of NISVS survey respond-
ents have not and will not assert any legal claims that will be liti-
gated before a court.  In addition, because almost no research has 
delved further into the statistics regarding multiracial women’s 
extreme vulnerability to the wide spectrum of gender-based vio-
lence measured by the NISVS, we do not know if multiracial 
women who identify as part African American face more, less, or 
similar rates of gender-based violence as multiracial women who 
self-identify as non-Black.  Moreover, as Liz’s case shows, self-
identification does not necessarily match the assumptions that the 
people engaging in the discriminatory acts may make about a mul-
tiracial person, while the NISVS relies on self-identification of the 
gender-based violence victim and does not ask any questions of 
those perpetrating the discrimination, including with regard to the 
race of their victims.7 The NISVS does not focus, as the civil rights 
litigation at the center of Professor Hernández’s analysis does, on 
the perceptions of the discriminator, regarding race or anything 
else. 
How either the NISVS data or Liz’s experience fits into two al-
ternative theories of discrimination against multiracial people is 
an additional question.  The first of these can be found in the legal 
multiracial-identity scholar literature that Professor Hernández 
addresses and critiques,8 and the other I most often see in cultural 
commentaries by multiracial people, often reflecting on or inspired 
by President Barack Obama’s multiracial background.9 In the 
 
7 Matthew J. Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalk-
ing, and Intimate Partner Violence Victimization - National Intimate Partner and Sexual 
Violence Survey, 63(8) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., (Sept. 5, 2014), at 6, 17, 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf. 
8 See id. at 8–9, 15.  
9 See generally e.g., WILL HARRIS, MIXED-RACE SUPERMAN: KEANU, OBAMA, AND 
MULTIRACIAL EXPERIENCE (Melville House Printing 2019) (2018) (exploring the legacies of 
Barack Obama and Keanu Reeves, and how their mixed raced heritages gave them a cul-
tural shapelessness that was a form of resistance); see also Jennifer Latson, The Biracial 
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remainder of this essay, I argue that the examples of both Liz’s 
hypothetical and the NISVS complicate all three theories of mul-
tiracial discrimination and suggest that it may in fact be too early 
to theorize at all, because we simply do not have enough infor-
mation—as an empirical, descriptive matter—about the experi-
ences of multiracial people, including with regard to experiences 
with discrimination.  Furthermore, without research or other 
mechanisms to discover and bring to light experiences like Liz’s, 
along with those of the many multiracial survivors of gender-based 
violence surveyed by the NISVS and those of those survivors’ abus-
ers, neither the nature of multiracial discrimination nor the effi-
cacy of using existing civil rights law to combat it is truly knowa-
ble.  
With these many questions in mind, I first focus on the gaps in 
our knowledge about discrimination against multiracial Ameri-
cans exposed by Liz’s hypothetical and how these demonstrate our 
highly partial understanding of such discrimination under all 
three discrimination theories.  I then add the NISVS data to the 
analysis to see what insights it can add to that partial understand-
ing.  Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about next steps for 
filling these gaps. 
 
I. LIZ’S HYPOTHETICAL 
 
The biggest difficulties for Liz’s case getting to court reside in 
her mind—the first having to do with her perceiving the discrimi-
nation at all and the second relating to her distaste at making a 
“reverse discrimination”-like legal claim.  Regarding the first—
yes, the strange conversation with the chair about how to report 
Liz’s race and the suggestion that clearing up some confusion 
about her race had been important enough to prompt the phone 
call had left Liz feeling “troubled.”  However, much of the call looks 
like a statistics-based version of a typical interaction for multira-
cial people, in which strangers ask various questions, subtle and 
not-at-all-subtle, about their race (from my own experiences: 
“where are you from?,” which is often followed with “No, I mean 
 
Advantage, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (May 28, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/arti-
cles/201905/the-biracial-advantage. 
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originally,” and, on one memorable occasion, by an employer on my 
first day of work: “what are you?!”).  It was not until her friend’s 
disclosure that the search committee had “misidentified” her race 
and her friend’s view that the misidentification was connected to 
the lack of an offer that Liz understood the real purpose of the 
chair’s call.   
A disconnect between phenotype and actual background/identi-
fication could lead to much more problematic situations than Liz’s.  
Multiracial people who identify with and live in families and com-
munities connected to a certain racial, ethnic history and experi-
ence would not necessarily understand or be able to identify biased 
or discriminatory behavior typically directed at a different racial, 
ethnic group.  For example, a Latina who wraps a scarf around her 
head and neck for warmth but does not know that Muslim women 
wear scarves for religious reasons, and who is fired because her 
manager discriminates against Muslims, might not realize that 
she was fired because her manager assumed she was Muslim.   
Moreover, such a hypothetical situation is much simpler than 
the complexity of what the research shows actually inhibits vic-
tims of discrimination from perceiving and identifying that dis-
crimination.  In Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psy-
chological Forces and Legal Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 
Professor Deborah Brake surveys much social-science literature 
on barriers to perceiving bias and identifying discrimination, both 
gender- and race-based.10 These barriers include:  
 
(1) an inability to perceive bias when it is directed at oneself 
even if one recognizes bias as a general problem and espe-
cially if the bias is manifested in subtle, not obvious, ways;11  
(2) the belief in a “just world” that supposedly judges people 
based on merit and therefore resists a self-image of victim, 
which is equated with “failure or irresponsibility” even if the 
 
10 See generally Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psy-
chological Forces and Legal Narratives that Obscure Legal Bias, 16 COLUM J. GENDER & L. 
67 (2007). 
11 See id. at 74-75. 
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victim recognizes the existence of discrimination against the 
victim’s social group;12  
(3) the tendency of people to compare themselves to those in 
their own social group, rather than looking to people outside 
their group, as well as to compare current experiences to 
past experiences, both of which elide a sense that one is be-
ing treated unfairly and inhibit feelings of entitlement that 
allow people to perceive that they deserve better;13  
(4) the inability, especially when a situation involves multiple 
criteria and is susceptible to multiple interpretations, to see 
discrimination unless one is presented with aggregate data 
about multiple instances of discrimination at once, a quite 
rare way for victims of discrimination to be presented with 
such evidence;14 
(5) the desire to avoid being retaliated against for reporting dis-
crimination, leading to dissonance that victims often elimi-
nate by suppressing their perceptions of discrimination or 
bias;15 and  
(6) the tendency of discrimination law to treat a lot of biased and 
discriminatory behavior as nevertheless “not actionable.”16 
 
This list of factors that commonly suppress victims’ perceptions 
of bias and discrimination is formidable enough when the victim’s 
self-identification and others’ identification of the victim match 
easily.  When self-identification and others’ identification do not 
match, such barriers likely become insurmountable.  Even if Liz 
herself had thought she had an actionable claim and sought to 
 
12 See id. at 76-81 (noting that a “just world” is associated with the ideology of individ-
ual responsibility which changes the meaning of victim to “failure or irresponsibility,” and 
contradicts seeing oneself as a victim). 
13 See id. at 81-83. “For example, a woman’s prior pay has a strong influence on her 
expectations about the level of pay she currently deserves. Since women on average receive 
less pay than men, the comparison to past experience is likely to suppress a woman’s sense 
of entitlement with respect to current pay. In this way, individual discrimination becomes 
self-reinforcing: people who have experienced discrimination believe that they deserve less 
and do not perceive persisting disadvantage as discriminatory or illegitimate, while persons 
with privilege have a strong sense of entitlement to continued favorable treatment.” Id. at 
83. 
14 See id. at 86-87. 
15 See id. at 91. 
16 See id. at 103. 
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bring suit, convincing a lawyer to take such a case (at least on a 
contingency fee basis, which would require the lawyer to feel con-
fident of winning any lawsuit) or successfully arguing discrimina-
tion in court seems virtually impossible. 
The likelihood that Liz’s case would never be litigated agrees in 
some respects with the points made by the multiracial-identity 
scholars, as well as with the critique of those points that Professor 
Hernández offers in her volume.  Multiracial-identity scholars 
suggest in various ways that discrimination against multiracial-
identified people is unique and therefore unique anti-discrimina-
tion legal theories and strategies are needed to combat it.17 Pro-
fessor Hernández rejects that approach because she sees multiple 
multiracial plaintiffs experiencing discrimination very similarly to 
how monoracial people of color experience discrimination, and she 
argues that existing civil rights law is fully capable of handling 
any incidentally unique aspects of multiracial persons’ experi-
ences with discrimination.18   
In both cases, the analysis is based primarily on court decisions 
involving multiracial plaintiffs.  Indeed, the small number of court 
decisions and the fact that many experiences, potentially including 
those similar to Liz’s, likely will never make it to court makes it 
quite premature to decide, as the multiracial-identity scholars’ 
theories do, that multiracial experiences of discrimination are sig-
nificantly different than other experiences of race discrimination, 
or to decide what any legal interventions should look like.  As such, 
the multiracial-identity scholars’ theories would also not be able 
to factor Liz’s experience into their analysis of multiracial discrim-
ination.  
Of even greater concern is Professor Hernández’s point that de-
claring multiracial discrimination to be unique presents dangers 
to civil rights laws and theories of discrimination because of the 
larger political context surrounding multiracial people.19 In bat-
tles over racial categories in the census, for instance, Professor 
Hernández has documented very clearly a political push primarily 
by White people to create a broad “multiracial” category that 
 
17 See HERNANDEZ, supra note 2, at 4–5.  
18 See id. at 5–6   
19 See id. at 14–15. 
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ignores the way in which multiracial people can have very differ-
ent experiences depending on which races make up their multira-
cial identity.20 In the United States, even casual observation 
would lead one to conclude that multiracial people who are clearly 
part African American are treated very differently from multira-
cial people who are clearly part Asian American.21 This is not to 
suggest that both groups will not face discrimination, but the kind 
of discrimination each group of multiracial Americans faces is 
likely quite different and, as Professor Hernández documents, 
more likely to be similar to monoracial Americans whose pheno-
type the multiracial group shares than to multiracial Americans 
whose racial heritage and phenotype are completely different.22 
An existing civil rights legal theory not only avoids these dan-
gers and deals with the concerns of the multiracial-identity schol-
arship, but it also presents a more useful analytic frame for Liz’s 
case: colorism.23 Colorism happens when members of the same ra-
cial group experience intra-racial or interracial discrimination be-
cause their skin color is lighter or darker.24 As such, it provides an 
example of Professor Hernández’s point that existing civil rights 
law already provides doctrines dealing with discrimination that 
multiracials may experience.  While those who have darker skin 
generally experience more interracial discrimination than those 
with lighter skin, as Professor Hernández discusses,25 claims of 
skin color discrimination also provide a mechanism to deal with 
intra-racial discrimination that might be directed at multiracial-
identifying people.  Like the approaches in the multiracial-identity 
scholarship, colorism is linked to racial mixing, whether recent or 
 
20 See id. at 98–100. 
21 See Elbert Lin, Yellow is Yellow, 20 YALE L & POL’Y REV. 529, 531, 535 (2002) (dis-
cussing how Asian American discrimination is separate and distinct from African American 
discrimination and the two should not be viewed through the same lens).  
22 See id. at 531; see also HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 6, 94 (discussing how multiracial 
people are discriminated against because they are perceived as monoracial more often than 
they are discriminated against for being mixed race). 
23 See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L. J. 1487, 1540 
(2000); see also Tauyna Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV., 
1705, 1725 (2003) (discussing how colorism is a useful lens to view discrimination claims 
brought by Latinx people because the ethnic variety of plaintiffs made it difficult to identify 
plaintiffs by race).   
24 See Banks, supra note 23, at 1711-12, 1714-15. 
25 See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 31. 
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centuries-old, but unlike those approaches, it focuses on the per-
ception of the accused discriminator, not on the identification of 
the multiracial person.26 
In Liz’s case, this focus could simplify the legal analysis, because 
Liz was perceived as Latina based on others’ interpretation of her 
phenotype, not her self-identification.  Approached using a color-
ism lens, Liz’s experience could potentially be more readily under-
stood as discriminatory in two different ways.  First, applying a 
colorism lens to Liz’s case would at least take Liz’s self-identifica-
tion out of the picture as a justification for her not receiving an 
offer.  Second, colorism among Latinx people has been noted and 
studied by multiple legal scholars, including Professor Hernández 
in Multiracials and Civil Rights, and these analyses indicate that, 
had the faculty considering Liz’s candidacy believed she was La-
tina through the end of the hiring process, she might have been a 
“beneficiary” of colorism (acknowledging that any person subject 
to a racism-based sorting system can only be described as a “ben-
eficiary” vis-à-vis other people of color who are treated worse by 
that system).27   
Discussions of colorism among Latinx Americans include both 
positive and negative accounts of racial mixing and its effects on 
the Latinx phenotype(s).  Key to understanding these discussions 
is the very different legal and social approach to racial mixing of 
Spanish colonialists, as compared to English colonialists.28 In the 
southern English territories, and later in many U.S. states, racial 
mixing was strictly prohibited by anti-miscegenation laws, and 
laws and social conventions such as the “one-drop rule” considered 
mixed-race persons, particularly if they were part Black and part 
White, to be only of the non-White race.29 In contrast, in the Span-
ish and Portuguese colonies and later countries across Latin 
America, a variety of racially mixed categories were acknowledged 
as a part of the colonial “caste” system, with those who had the 
lightest skin and the most European phenotype sorted into the 
 
26 See Banks, supra note 23, at 1739, 1742. 
27 See Hernández, supra note 2, at 16.  
28 See George Mariscal, The Role of Spain in Contemporary Race Theory, 2 ARIZ. J. HISP. 
CULTURAL STUD. 7, 9, 17 (1998).  
29 See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the “One Drop” Rule, in MIXED RACE 
AMERICA AND THE LAW 104 (Kevin Johnson ed., 2003).  
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highest classes.30 While this system is rightly seen as just as racist 
as the U.S. system,31 racial mixing has also been embraced by 
many Latin American countries, artists, and intellectuals under 
the umbrella of “mestizaje,” which links both individual and na-
tional identity to interracial and intercultural mixing in affirma-
tive, celebratory, even glorifying ways.32  
Mestizaje is a concept first articulated by Mexican philosopher 
José Vasconcelos in his essay, La Raza Cosmica (The Cosmic 
Race), which declared that mestizos were a “Cosmic Race . . . 
formed by the ‘synthesis’ of the existing races,”33 to become the 
“‘leader in a new world order.’”34 Explicating the important cul-
tural and national influence of mestizaje in full detail is beyond 
the scope of this essay, but its influence on U.S. Latinx people is 
clear.  For instance, the American Chicano/a movement that began 
in the 1960s was inspired in part by the mestizaje concept.35 Intel-
lectuals such as Chicana feminist philosopher, Dr. Gloria Anzal-
dua, advanced similar ideas of a “new mestizo,” who could move 
between cultures and was “uniquely positioned to help generate 
new types of cultural knowledge.”36 Latina sociologist, Dr. Clara 
E. Rodriguez, notes that Latinx people in the U.S. tend to view 
race as a continuum as opposed to a binary construct, based less 
on genealogical-biological criteria than on mestizaje-reminiscent 
factors such as “national origin, nationality, ethnicity, culture, or 
a combination of these and skin color.”37  
 
30 See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, ‘Mestizo’ and ‘mulatto’: Mixed-race identities among U.S. 
Hispanics, PEW RES. CENT. (July 10, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/07/10/mestizo-and-mulatto-mixed-race-identities-unique-to-hispanics/. 
31 See Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Dark-
ness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis 
of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 150-51 (1997); see also Laura M. Padilla, 
Social and Legal Repercussions of Latinos’ Colonized Mentality, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769, 
773-74, 779 (1999).   
32 See Lourdes Martinez-Echazabal, Mestizaje and the Discourse of National/Cultural 
Identity in Latin America, 1845-1959, 25 LATIN AM. PERSP. 21, 38 (1998).  
33 George A. Martínez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law: A Philosophical Perspective, 
20 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1999).  
34 Linnete Manrique, Dreaming of a Cosmic Race: José Vasconcelos and the Politics of 
Race in Mexico, 1920s-1930s, 3 COGENT ARTS & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2016).  
35 See id. at 2, 9-10.   
36 Martínez, supra note 33, at 18.   
37 See Clara E. Rodriguez, The Question of Race, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION 45 (Rich-
ard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2010).  
3. CANTALUPO MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/21  9:32 AM 
2021]“I THINK YOU DIDN’T GET IT BECAUSE THEY MISIDENTIFIED YOU AS LATINA” 51 
 
A colorism analysis would predict that either the positive or neg-
ative versions of the Latin American history and approach to racial 
mixing would push in favor of hiring Liz, had she remained Latina 
in the eyes of those considering her candidacy and assuming the 
faculty’s interest in hiring a Latina was genuine and reasonably 
strong.  Liz’s skin color is on the lighter side of the spectrum, and 
she looks more like those with mixed White and indigenous ances-
try than those with mixed White and African ancestry.38 There-
fore, regardless of whether the faculty making the decision was 
influenced by skin color according to race-based class ideas or mes-
tizaje philosophies, colorism likely would have improved Liz’s 
chances of being hired, at least compared to other Latinx candi-
dates, either actual or theoretical.  However, once her self-identi-
fication as non-Latina entered the picture, it appears that Liz was 
no longer considered a person of color.  Therefore, Liz would no 
longer be subject to ranking systems based on skin color and would 
lose any colorism-related “advantages” attached to her phenotype.  
Indeed, because the hiring faculty was rightfully determined to 
reach their goal of diversifying the law faculty, their perception 
that Liz was White appears to have ended her candidacy. 
Several factors in Liz’s story indicate that once her non-Latina 
identification was known, she was in fact categorized as White.  
Evidence of this includes the chair’s confusion about how to list 
Liz’s demographic information in her report on the school’s faculty 
hiring, as well as the White female faculty member’s remark to Liz 
implying that she was basically the same as those already on the 
school’s White-dominated faculty.  This perception, that the hiring 
faculty had categorized her as White, not only likely played a role 
in ending her candidacy, but, according to Liz, definitely ended any 
chance that she would consider legal action, in light of her distaste 
in bringing a claim that suggested an accusation of “reverse dis-
crimination.”  Liz’s decision to not consult a lawyer about filing a 
discrimination lawsuit led to the problem with which my analysis 
starts: the unlikelihood of Liz’s case, or others like it (if they exist), 
reaching a court. 
I see in this distaste a recognition that Liz’s multiracial herit-
age—and the racially ambiguous phenotype resulting from racial 
 
38 See Gonzalez-Barrera, supra note 30. 
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mixing—has allowed her to experience many of the benefits of 
Whiteness.  This perception is influenced by my own similar expe-
riences.  Throughout my life, people I have met have guessed that 
my heritage included one or more of the following races/ethnicities: 
African/African American, Central Asian, Happa (a term my 
friends from Hawaii used to designate mixed Asian or Hawaiian-
White people), Latina, Native American/American Indian, Paki-
stani, White American, and virtually every ethnicity from loca-
tions bordering the Mediterranean Sea.  When people of color en-
gaged in such guessing games, they usually started guessing based 
on a (usually inaccurate) suspicion that I shared a race or ethnicity 
with them.  I enjoyed this tendency because many of my interac-
tions with strangers in the large, cosmopolitan cities in which I 
have lived for most of my life started out pleasantly, with a widely 
diverse range of my fellow Americans thinking of me, at least 
briefly, as “one of them.”   
However, with White Americans (especially those of primarily 
western and northern European ancestry), I usually experience 
the racial/ethnic guessing game, whether explicit or not, as signif-
icantly more fraught.  I am aware that many White Americans 
suspect that I may be a person of color, but without information 
one way or another, they usually end up assuming I am White.  As 
Professor Hernández discusses in Chapter Three, this assumption 
has more to do with constructions of Whiteness and White privi-
lege than with anything about me.39 For most people of my ac-
quaintance who appear not to have ever thought critically about 
race or racial identity (a category dominated by Whites in my ex-
perience), White people are “race-less.”40 They are just “people,” 
not “White people.”  Therefore, when my phenotype ambiguity 
makes it impossible to assign me a race, many will think of me as 
race-less, which then translates into White, because, in the U.S. at 
least, only White people are race-less.41 An important note regard-
ing these experiences, which also relate to the civil rights litigation 
Professor Hernández studies in her volume: although I am occa-
sionally mistaken for African American, most of the time I am not 
 
39 See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 47-48, 51.  
40 See id. at 47. 
41 See id. at 47-48. 
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assumed to be part Black.  If I were, I suspect that the anti-Black 
animus that motivates so many of the cases in Professor Hernán-
dez’s study would preclude any assumptions of racelessness or 
Whiteness. 
As long as I am not perceived to be part Black, this process 
makes me White by default, with the result that I enjoy a fair 
amount—maybe the full amount—of White privilege.42 In other 
words, my racially ambiguous phenotype—as long as it doesn’t 
suggest that I am part Black and therefore trigger the anti-Black-
ness that Professor Hernández documents so effectively—has led 
to more race-based privilege than discrimination.  As such, I can 
relate to Liz’s characterization and rejection of any legal claim she 
might have made as implying “reverse discrimination” because she 
objected to her racial identity being misidentified and then ne-
gated through a process by which “I’m not sure of her race” became 
“she has no race,” which then merged seamlessly into “she’s 
White.”  I agree with Liz’s view that objecting to such a process 
when it resulted in not getting a job just seems wrong when that 
same process of conferring Whiteness and its privileges has likely 
overwhelmingly resulted in getting jobs.  
This aspect of Liz’s and my experiences illustrates the last the-
ory of discrimination against multiracials to which I referred at 
the outset of this commentary: a cultural narrative that I associate 
with reflections on President Obama’s multiracial ancestry and 
the benefits being multiracial created in terms of, in particular, 
getting elected President.43 According to this narrative, the bene-
fits of being multiracial in the U.S. far outweigh any discrimina-
tion multiracial people might experience.44 Multiracial people, 
who are often assumed to be part White, are assumed to benefit 
from proximity to White people, to gain some of the privileges of 
Whiteness through being raised by and/or among White people, 
even if their phenotype is obviously not White or not fully White.45 
This theory largely comports with Liz’s and my experiences of “de-
fault Whiteness” as related above. 
 
42 See id. 
43 See generally HARRIS, supra note 9. 
44 See Latson, supra note 9.  
45 See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at xv, 21, 30-31. 
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II.   THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY 
 
Despite the consistency of these experiences, the under, or even 
unremarked statistics of the NISVS calls them into question.  
These statistics show that in their lifetimes 53.8% of multiracial 
women in the U.S. experience rape, physical violence and/or stalk-
ing by an intimate partner, 33.5% have been raped, and 64.1% 
have been subjected to conduct fitting the civil rights definition of 
sexual harassment.46 By contrast, the next most victimized group 
of women or men (transgendered persons were not measured by 
the NISVS) are American Indian or Alaskan Native women, who 
experience these forms of gender-based violence at rates of 46%, 
27.5%, and 55%, respectively.47 In terms of other monoracial 
groups, case counts of Asian or Pacific Islander women who were 
raped were too small to provide statistically reliable percentages, 
but 31.9% of Asian or Pacific Islander women experienced sexual 
violence other than rape in their lifetime.48 For Hispanic women, 
the lifetime prevalence of rape was 13.6% and the lifetime preva-
lence of sexual violence other than rape was 35.6%.49 Finally, 
21.2% of non-Hispanic Black women and 20.5% of non-Hispanic 
White women experienced rape in their lifetimes, and each group 
experienced a lifetime prevalence of sexual violence other than 
rape at 38.2% and 46.9%, respectively.50 Multiracial men also ex-
perience high rates of violence compared to men in other racial 
groups, suggesting that multiracial identification is in fact a rele-
vant, if not the dispositive, characteristic leading to this greater 
vulnerability51  
Both social science and legal research has addressed gender-
based violence directed at Native American women.  It is therefore 
noteworthy that, despite multiracial women experiencing even 
higher rates of violence and harassment, the NISVS itself 
 
46 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; see also Breiding, supra note 7, at 5. 
47 See id. 
48 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 5. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 11. 
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indicates that minimal research—if any at all—has been con-
ducted to delve into these statistics, stating that “little is known 
about why multiracial women are at greater risk for these forms 
of violence,” and “[r]esearch is needed to identify risk and protec-
tive factors for violence victimization among multiracial per-
sons.”52 
The size and scope of the NISVS, along with data from the Pew 
Research Center’s 2015 survey of U.S. multiracials, show that the 
rates of sexual harassment directed at multiracial Americans 
point to a serious, potentially widespread and growing, problem.53 
First, the NISVS arguably provides the nation’s most comprehen-
sive and accurate sexual harassment data, including against mul-
tiracial people.54 It does not depend on the filing of official com-
plaints or other formal reporting to gather information about 
sexual harassment and other forms of gender-based violence.55 In-
stead, it asks whether the survey respondent has experienced cer-
tain kinds of conduct over the course of the respondent’s lifetime, 
then sorts the respondent’s answers into categories such as rape, 
sexual coercion, being made to penetrate a perpetrator, unwanted 
sexual contact, and non-contact unwanted sexual experiences.56 
These experiences may never have been formally reported to any 
officials, and by asking questions about conduct, the survey does 
not rely on respondents to identify any conduct as a legal viola-
tion.57 In this sense, those who were surveyed by the NISVS are 
closer to the hypothetical Liz than any of the plaintiffs who appear 
in the cases considered by both Professor Hernández and multira-
cial identity scholars.  
The NISVS is a very large scale, national-sample study.58 “[A] 
national random-digit–dial telephone survey of the 
 
52 Id. at 16. 
53 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 5; KIM PARKER ET AL., MULTIRACIAL IN AMERICA: 
PROUD, DIVERSE AND GROWING IN NUMBERS 11 (2015), https://www.pewsocial-
trends.org/2015/06/11/multiracial-in-america/.  
54 See generally Breiding et al., supra note 7. 
55 See id. at 1, 3. 
56 See id. at 1, 3, 4. 
57 See id. at 3. See generally CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (NISVS) 2011 VICTIMIZATION 
QUESTIONS (2014), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/24726. 
58 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 1, 3. 
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noninstitutionalized English- and Spanish-speaking U.S. popula-
tion aged ≥18 years,” it was conducted via landline (40%) and cel-
lular (60%) telephones.59 In 2011, it collected data from 12,727 
completed interviews, 6879 with women and 5848 with men.60 
While its title suggests that the conduct it measures is narrower 
than the full range of conduct included in the definition of sexual 
harassment under civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational Amend-
ments of 1972, in fact the NISVS measures a comparably broad 
range of sexually harassing behaviors.61 For instance, the survey 
asks respondents questions regarding whether they have experi-
enced visual sexual harassment such as indecent exposure, show-
ing of pornography, and taking photos of or filming the victim 
when the victim did not want to be photographed/filmed.62 It also 
asks about verbal harassment in public places that made the vic-
tim “feel unsafe.”63 With regard to sexually-harassing conduct that 
involves physical contact but without sexual penetration, the 
NISVS measures sexual kissing, fondling, groping, grabbing or 
other touching that made the victim feel unsafe.64 
While the NISVS measures the large extent of the sexual har-
assment problem for multiracial women (compared to every group 
studied) and men (compared to other men), the Pew Research Cen-
ter’s survey of multiracial Americans (“Pew’s study”) shows not 
only that this population may be larger than what most people 
would guess, but also that it is growing very rapidly.65 Between 
the 2000 and 2010 censuses, for instance, the biracial White and 
Black population more than doubled, and the biracial White and 
Asian population increased by 87%.66 These increases are part of 
an overall exponential jump in the number of U.S. multiracial peo-
ple, where the percentage of multiracial babies born increased 
 
59 Id. 
60 See id. at 3. 
61 See id. at 3-4. 
62 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION , supra note 57. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 5-6; PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 32, 36-37 
(finding that the mixed-race adult population may be three times greater than the govern-
ment estimates, and is growing rapidly). 
66 See PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 6. 
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nine-fold between 1970 and 2013,67 and the Census Bureau ex-
pects the multiracial population to triple by 2060, provided current 
trends continue.68 
Viewing the NISVS together with Pew’s study makes clear that 
a substantial population of Americans may be experiencing a sig-
nificant amount of discrimination because they are multiracial.69 
Sexual harassment, which includes sexual and intimate partner 
violence as severe forms of sexual harassment, has long been rec-
ognized as a form of discrimination.70 Therefore, the NISVS data 
points to an instance where multiracial Americans appear to face 
greater amounts of discrimination than other (monoracial) people 
of color.  As such, this data point does not fit well with any of the 
theories of multiracial discrimination discussed thus far.  Obvi-
ously, a theory that focuses on the ways that multiracial people 
benefit from being multiracial would not account for a form of dis-
crimination that disproportionately affects multiracial people.  
However, neither Professor Hernández’s thesis nor the multira-
cial-identity scholars’ theories provide a reasonably complete way 
to understand this statistic either.  Each only gets us part of the 
way there, then gets stuck. 
Professor Hernández’s analysis accounts for the factors that 
lead to higher rates of sexual harassment for all women of color, 
monoracial or multiracial.71 Multiracial women likely are affected 
by many of the same causes that researchers and scholars have 
advanced for the higher rates of sexual harassment and violence 
experienced by single-race-identified women of color.72 There is no 
reason to believe that the stereotypes and other risk factors that 
single-race-identified women of color face wouldn’t also apply to 
multiracial women, particularly those multiracial women who are 
 
67 See id. at 11. 
68 See id. 
69 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 5-6; PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 32. 
70 Catharine A. MacKinnon’s 1979 book became recognized as the definitive articula-
tion of why sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex or gender discrimination. See 
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 1,4 (1979).  
71 See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 12. 
72 I have written about these factors extensively in Nancy Chi Cantalupo, And Even 
More of Us Are Brave: Intersectionality & Sexual Harassment of Women Students of Color, 
42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 24-41  (2019). 
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identified by others as being at least partly “of color.”  Pew’s study 
confirms Professor Hernández’s analysis—as well as my own ex-
periences—in several ways: (1) multiracial Americans do experi-
ence race discrimination and (2) the discrimination they face gen-
erally tracks how much they are considered by others to be 
individuals of color.73 Only 26% of the multiracial people who said 
that “most people who pass them on the street” would describe 
them as White said that they had experienced race discrimination; 
by contrast,  those who said others would identify them as Black 
were nearly two times more likely to experience such discrimina-
tion.74  
The discrimination that respondents in the Pew survey reported 
as race discrimination could very well have included sexual har-
assment or sexual violence, especially if those instances were in-
tersectionally discriminatory, as decades of studies in the work-
place, educational institutions, and the criminal legal system 
have shown most if not all of the sexual harassment directed at 
women of color to be.75 Racialized sex stereotypes (or sexualized 
racial stereotypes) are a particularly pernicious cause of this vul-
nerability, stereotyping women of color as prostitutes or promis-
cuous.76 African American women are stereotyped as “Jeze-
bels,”77 Latinas as “‘hot-blooded,’”78 Asian Pacific Islander and 
Asian Pacific American women as “submissive and naturally 
erotic,”79 and American Indian/Native American women as 
 
73 See PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 51. 
74 See id. at 57 (An average of 52.6% of black-identified (by others) said they experi-
enced the five forms of race discrimination discussed by Pew, also 50.4% of multiracially-
identified (by others), and 43.6% of Hispanic-identified (by others)). 
75 See Cantalupo, supra note 72, at 25. 
76 See id. at 17. 
77 Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with Implications for the 
Debates Over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 185, 214 (2014); 
see also Jessica C. Harris, Centering Women of Color in the Discourse on Sexual Violence on 
College Campuses, in INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS: 
CENTERING MINORITIZED STUDENTS’ EXPERIENCES 71-73 (Jessica C. Harris & Chris Linder 
eds., 2017). 
78 Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 
23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 820 (1993); see also Darlene C. DeFour, The Interface of 
Racism and Sexism on College Campuses, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON 
CAMPUS 49, 52 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990). 
79 Ontiveros, supra note 78, at 819; see also Harris, supra note 77, at 71-73; Ciera V. 
Scott et al., The Intersections of Lived Oppression and Resilience: Sexual Violence Preven-
tion for Women of Color on College Campuses, in INTERSECTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SEXUAL 
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“sexual punching bag(s)”80 who are “‘sexually violable’”81 as a 
“‘tool of war’” and colonization.82 As is clear from each of these 
examples, race and gender are so intertwined in these stereo-
types that they cannot be separated into discrete categories of 
discrimination based on race versus gender.  These stereotypes 
then combine with stereotypes deriving from centuries of dis-
crimination against sexual violence victims in criminal proceed-
ings, in which a series of special requirements for the common 
law crime of rape included the rule that a woman had to be chaste 
(meaning as close to a virgin as possible) in order to credibly al-
lege rape.83 
Still, while multiracial women’s identification by others as “of 
color” may subject multiracial women to similar stereotypes and 
other factors that increase their vulnerability, if this were the full 
story, the rates at which multiracial women experience harass-
ment/violence would likely be at least the same, if not somewhat 
lower, than the highest rates of violence experienced by each of the 
single-race groups tracked by the NISVS.84 Because the statistics 
for multiracial women are considerably higher than the highest of 
the single-race-identified groups, however, other factors must also 
be at work.  Therefore, a theory that discrimination against mul-
tiracial people operates substantially similarly to that against 
monoracial people who share the multiracial person’s phenotype 
appears to break down with regard to sexual harassment. 
Nevertheless, the multiracial-identity scholars’ theories also do 
not assist in understanding this statistic, nor is there any indica-
tion that the new legal interventions these scholars suggest will 
help multiracial sexual harassment victims.  Indeed, the 
 
VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS: CENTERING MINORITIZED STUDENTS’ EXPERIENCES 119, 150–51 
(Jessica C. Harris & Chris Linder eds., 2017). 
80 See Debra Merskin, The S-Word: Discourse, Stereotypes, and the American Indian 
Woman, 21 HOW. J. COMM. 345, 353 (2010); see generally Sarah Deer, Toward an Indige-
nous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121 (2004-2005). 
81 Harris, supra note 77, at 71-73 
82 Scott et al., supra note 79, at 150-51. 
83 See Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social Attitudes 
toward Acquaintance Rape Victims, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 644, 644-45 (2010) (“The marital 
rape exemption and the historical requirements in rape law of resistance, corroboration, 
and chastity continue to infect both statutory law and the way that actors with[in] the 
criminal justice system—police, prosecutors, judges, and juries—see the crime of rape.”). 
84 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 6. 
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disproportionate targeting of multiracials for sexual harassment85 
and the (non-)reaction to that data point by researchers86 exposes 
the problems with the multiracial-identity scholars’ theories in 
ways that confirm the validity of Professor Hernández’s critique.  
First, as already noted, NISVS researchers admit that little to no 
research has been done to probe further into the statistic.87 This 
seeming incuriosity extends to a failure to delve into data already 
collected by the NISVS.88 Although the main report on the NISVS 
data discusses the prevalence of sexual harassment among multi-
racial women and men generally, the multiracial category the 
NISVS report uses is actually created by aggregating the answers 
of all the survey respondents who listed more than one race in 
their responses.89 Because the NISVS collected demographic infor-
mation about race and ethnicity from respondents using a “check 
all that apply” approach, the raw data includes information re-
garding the number of respondents who identify as Black and 
White or as Asian and Latinx or as one of 55 other combinations.90 
Yet no effort appears to have been made to analyze the data in a 
manner that would determine what percentage of, for instance, 
Black Asian multiracials and White American Indian multiracials 
experience sexual harassment.   
This failure proves Professor Hernández’s point regarding the 
dangers of “multiracial” categories, which are advanced by some 
multiracial-identity scholars as needed to address what they re-
gard as a unique multiracial experience.  Such categories treat all 
multiracial people the same, regardless of what might be a consid-
erable diversity of experience, including with discrimination.91 
Considering that the NISVS has already collected this raw data, 
the failure to analyze it creates an impression of continuity and 
commonality between specific multiracial populations where there 
may not be one in reality.  We cannot know, for instance, whether 
 
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 16. 
87 See id. 
88 See infra, paragraph containing n. 91. 
89 See PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 20, 32. 
90 See INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & SOC. RSCH., NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER 
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (NISVS): GENERAL POPULATION SURVEY RAW DATA, 2011 2, 
4 (2011), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/NACJD/studies/37520/datadocumentation#.  
91 See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 5-7. 
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the NISVS data indicates that any particular combination of 
races/ethnicities leads to heightened vulnerability for sexual har-
assment and, if so, which combinations those are.  For instance, is 
there a clear pattern of anti-Black discrimination in sexual har-
assment cases, as Professor Hernández sees in the court cases she 
reviews in Multiracials and Civil Rights?92 
It is entirely possible—likely, even—that the lumping together 
of all multiracial respondents into one category without differenti-
ation is mainly a reflection of researchers’ unwillingness and/or 
lack of time/resources to engage in such microanalysis, especially 
because of the wide range of possible combinations.  Because the 
NISVS follows the U.S. 2010 Census, which allowed people to se-
lect multiple races, there are 57 possible racial combinations93 in 
the raw data collected from NISVS respondents.  For obvious rea-
sons, it is much easier to aggregate these groups into the “multi-
racial” category that appears in the reports on the NISVS data 
than to look at 57 categories individually and to compare even 
some of them to each other to get a more granular sense of the 
problem.94 In addition, if many or all of the 57 individual catego-
ries contain too few respondents, they may preclude drawing sta-
tistically reliable conclusions from the data.  Nevertheless, as a 
consequence of this aggregation of 57 possible combinations, the 
existing reports provide no way to determine which multiracial 
populations experience greater rates of sexual harassment or if the 
rates are relatively consistent across all multiracial categories. 
Moreover, even if such granular analysis was provided in exist-
ing NISVS reports, the NISVS collects data only from harassment 
victims (in that it does not ask questions about perpetration of har-
assment and therefore anyone surveyed who was a perpetrator 
and not a victim would not be included or represented in the study) 
and relies on victims’ demographic self-identification.95 Thus, it 
plays into the other problem that Professor Hernández identifies 
with the multiracial-identity scholar approach: conflating or flat-
out replacing any measurement of discrimination, which is about 
 
92 See id. at 5-6. 
93 PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 20. 
94 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 6; PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 20. 
95 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 6, 17. 
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bias and animus by others (e.g., employers, school officials, land-
lords) against the victim, with the victim’s own identity catego-
ries.96 Because of its source (harassment victims), even the NISVS 
raw data is limited in the insights it can provide as to why multi-
racials (or some multiracial groups) are more vulnerable to the dis-
crimination constituted by sexual harassment.  Indeed, the survey 
engages in the same politically dangerous suggestion that some-
thing about the victim is more important than the illegal conduct 
of the perpetrator.  It also ultimately fails to address—may even 
further complicate—discrimination such as that experienced by 
Liz, where others’ assumptions as to her racial identity, absent her 
friend’s disclosure, would have been virtually impossible for her to 
perceive since they in no respect matched her self-identification. 
 
III.   RESEARCHING THE MULTIRACIAL AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
WITH DISCRIMINATION 
 
Ultimately, both the possibly idiosyncratic case of discrimina-
tion that Liz experienced and the broad-based problem of discrim-
ination in the form of disproportionately high rates of sexual har-
assment exposed by the NISVS show that we simply do not yet 
have enough information about multiracial Americans’ experi-
ences with discrimination to craft legal interventions likely to be 
effective.  Without significantly more empirical measuring of mul-
tiracial people’s experiences with discrimination, we simply can-
not know if using existing civil rights law is adequate or if innova-
tions are required. 
Such measurement will not be easy, however.  Liz’s experience 
points to the potential problem of looking at legal actions—i.e. 
court cases—alone to measure the extent and kind of multiracial 
discrimination that is occurring.  The NISVS as well as Pew’s 
study provide both hope and additional caution about an alterna-
tive way of measuring discrimination.  On the one (hopeful) hand, 
both show the usefulness of the “check all that apply” approach to 
identifying who is multiracial, as opposed to the generic 
 
96 See Tanya K. Hernández, Multiracial Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of 
Colorblind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 105 (1998). 
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“multiracial” category.97 Pew’s study was able to identify various 
data points, including some initial, if somewhat shallow, infor-
mation about experiences with discrimination by specific multira-
cial populations, enough to show that experiencing discrimination 
does vary depending on whether a multiracial person’s phenotype 
makes them look more White versus more African American.98 
Professor Hernández discusses smaller studies that collected sim-
ilar data.99 The NISVS’s raw data provides another opportunity, 
on a large, national scale, to investigate a specific form of discrim-
ination that the aggregated multiracial category indicates is a par-
ticular problem for this population.100 
On the other (not hopeful) hand, the NISVS points to another 
measurement problem—one that affects Pew’s study and plagues 
much research that aims to assess harmful conduct.  As already 
noted, trying to understand discrimination by asking questions of 
the victims of that discrimination is inherently limited.101 The 
multiracial experience, made concrete by Liz’s “based on true 
events” hypothetical, highlights these limits.  Absent her friend’s 
offhand remark about Liz not being made an offer because she was 
misidentified as Latina, Liz would not have known what was re-
ally affecting her candidacy in that search.  Even when discrimi-
nation is measured without reliance on formal complaints, the vic-
tim’s knowledge of its existence is likely to be limited by all of the 
factors already discussed , a list that is potentially longer for mul-
tiracial victims who face misidentification problems like Liz did.  
For the full story on whether discrimination occurred and why, one 
must ask the discriminator.  Such research is definitely more dif-
ficult, but not impossible, as it has been done in the context of sex-
ual assault, and not only with those convicted of criminal sex of-
fenses, but also those whose sexual harassment has gone 
undetected.102   
 
97 See PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 19. 
98 See id.at 8-9. 
99 See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 108. 
100 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 3. 
101 See Brake, supra note 10, at 97-98. 
102 See, e.g., David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among 
Undetected Rapists, 17(1) VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73 (2002). 
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A challenge for all scholars interested in this subject is to initi-
ate and conduct such empirical research so we can craft and/or use 
existing legal interventions more effectively, in response to fuller 
and better information.  I have plans to work with a criminologist 
colleague to delve into the raw data from the NISVS to discover as 
much as possible from data that has already been collected.103 I 
also hope that Professor Hernández will be inspired to engage in 
such research, as she has done very insightful empirical research 
in the past.104 
In sum, Professor Hernández is right that, absent more infor-
mation about how discrimination against multiracial people oper-
ates, there is not only no reason to change established civil rights 
law to address multiracial discrimination but doing so is danger-
ous to using those established laws to address discrimination 
against other (mainly monoracial) people of color.  Nevertheless, 
we should not shy away from what will certainly be a difficult re-
search challenge: gathering enough information about the nature 
and dynamics of discrimination against multiracial people so that 
we can identify whether there is discrimination uniquely targeting 
multiracial people, as well as whether that discrimination calls for 
changes in civil rights law and doctrine.  
 
 
103 See Breiding et al., supra note 7, at 4. 
104 See Tanya Katerí Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: 
Sexual Harassment & the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1238-
39 (2005). 
